Thank you very much for the opportunity to be here

to address the Committee. I am also going to summarize my statement

by first focusing on contributions of the Perry review process.

I think the primary contribution has been the alignment of policies

among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, in favor of

working with the North Korean leadership to engage in mutual

threat reduction in return for the creation of a more benign international

environment necessary for North Korea’s regime survival.

The policy coordination effort itself is unprecedented and has potentially

significant implications for the shape of future security relations

in Northeast Asia, including perpetuation of U.S. alliances

with Japan and South Korea as part of the shaping of that security

environment.

Another result of the policy review process has been to underscore

both the practical limits and essentially unsatisfactory nature

of the options available, and the difficulties of achieving a political

consensus on how to deal with North Korea in the United States,

Japan, and South Korea.

The true test of success or failure of the Perry process in the

long-term will depend on whether or not the following positive developments

are sustainable—first, continued strengthened alliance

coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea to

prepare along the two-pronged path of engagement or confrontation;

second, the ability of the Administration to move from the design

phase represented by the policy review process to overseeing

an implementation process while maintaining bipartisan political

support; and third, an ongoing and regularized engagement with

North Korean leaders at higher levels that gives North Korea a

stake in and benefits from an engagement process, so that leaders

in Pyongyang recognize that they have so much to lose that they

cannot afford to walk away.

Although it is necessary to be realistic about the ability of any

external party to influence Pyongyang’s process of policy formation,

the relative influence of external actors and policies toward North

Korea clearly has increased during the past decade from a lowlevel.

This trend has critical significance for policy toward North

Korea, in my view, because it means that the focus of the debate

increasingly should not be over whether to provide external assistance,

but over how to provide assistance and in what forms. To be

more specific, it seems to me that the issue of whether or not that

assistance is being provided in such a way that strengthens the

current regime is a critical criterion that one wants to look at in

terms of assessing those efforts.

So the critical objective of the U.S. and the international community

is how to increase the pace of positive change in North Korea,

while the objective of Pyongyang’s leadership, focused on regime

survival, is to control the pace of change in ways that do not

threaten their political control.

In my view, the single criterion by which all assistance should

be judged is whether or not that assistance increases the pace of

change in ways that facilitate North Korea’s integration with the

international community, or whether that assistance actually reinforces

policies or gives new life to systems in North Korea that

have already failed.

This benchmark has critical implications for how food assistance

is provided, how one thinks about issues such as sanctions lifting

for implementation of the KEDO project, and which actors inside

North Korea are best suited to serve as counterparts to external

parties.

The coordinated policy approach toward North Korea that the

Perry process has helped to put into place is important for several

reasons. First, it manages the differences in priority on specific

issues that may exist internally between the United States and

Japan, or the United States and South Korea.

Second, it reduces the ability of North Korea to exploit differences

in the policy stances of allies.

Third, it underscores the importance of containing North Korea’s

destabilizing behavior while expanding the base of resources available

as part of an engagement strategy with North Korea.

Fourth, it diminishes the possibility that precipitous unilateral

action against North Korea by any single party in the coordination

process will lead to the spread of broader conflicts in Northeast

Asia.

Here I would just note that the coordination process is demonstrated

in the way in which the United States, Japan, and South

Korea are working to approach North Korea diplomatically. It also

has extended what I would call comprehensive deterrents against

North Korean destabilizing action. I think this is particularly evident

in some of the Japanese attitudes in the national Diet, with

regards to some of the negative activities that North Korea is engaging

in that impacts Japan in various ways that were mentioned

earlier in the session.

The fundamental irony in engaging North Korea is that North

Korea has also reached a point where its options have narrowed to

the single option of engagement with the outside world, despite

Pyongyang’s protracted search for alternatives to the kinds of engagement

with the international community that will require real

changes in their own system.

The Perry process at this point is the best way to test North Korean

intentions and frame hard choices for Pyongyang’s leadership.

Gradually, the realities of North Korea’s increased dependence for

regime survival on external inputs are being revealed. I think this

reality is well-known to North Korean diplomats, including one

that privately expressed to me his vision for improved U.S.-North

Korea relations as a process through which two parties, both in

danger of drowning, have to save each other.

So, in summary, North Korea’s system is caught in a contradiction

between its long-standing revolutionary nationalist and socialist

ideological aspirations, and the North Korean reality of a highly

traditional dynastic and feudalistic system, in the words of the

highest ranking defector, Hwang Jang Yop.

North Korea’s past approaches to the outside world have been

highly consistent, even if they are often self-defeating. These days,

North Korean approaches to the outside world are also increasingly

tempered by a mix of dependency, desperation, paranoia, and pragmatism

borne of the reality of North Korea’s essential weakness

and isolation.

The primary achievement of the Perry review process is that it

has provided an opportunity to manage, and possibly avoid, renewed

crisis with North Korea, but it does not guarantee that crisis

will indeed be avoided. The next equally difficult task is to test

whether there is sufficient political will in Pyongyang to overcome

some of the differences between the United States, South Korea,

and Japan, by pursuing concrete tension reduction measures. In essence,

the question of whether moving to a normalized relationship

with North Korea will also lead to a normalized North Korea in its

relations with the rest of the world.

That is right. External assistance can be used to facilitate

changes in North Korea, although still at a very limited

level.

Yes, I have been there four times.

I have not been involved in the KEDO process.

These were academic study missions led in three

cases by Professor Robert Scalapino when I was working with the

Asia Society and at the U.S. Institute of Peace.

I believe that part of North Korea’s strategy in dealing

with the United States is to try to draw resources to itself without

giving very much in return. I would agree with some of the

comments that Mitchell Reiss made earlier on that note.

The basic vehicle by which the—what North Korea

is doing in order to enhance its negotiating capacity with the

United States is trying to show that it has alternatives to negotiation.

It is trying to demonstrate commitment and maintain control

over the negotiating agenda.

Our objective should be to cutoff the alternatives to a negotiation

process, and to try to maintain our own commitment and control

over a negotiating process that leads in the direction that we want

North Korea to go in.

Two hundred pages. I will be glad to give you a

copy later.